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SUMMARY 
EU membership imposes significant environmental pressures on the 
New Member states (NMS’s). This paper questions whether top 
down imposition of EU environmental regulation is the best strategy 
for the environmental problems of Central and Eastern Europe. 
While the emissions’ record has greatly improved, it remains un-
clear how much of this is directly related to EU membership. Sig-
nificant costs are attached to fulfilling EU environmental criteria 
while remarkably smaller amounts of funding come attached to the 
EU membership agreement. Top-down imposition of environmental 
objectives may divert attention from local, regional and state level 
environmental needs, preferences and priorities. Accepting the man-
tle of EU environmental policy means adopting a policy structure 
that, in many ways, is dominated by the interests and priorities of 
the large and more advanced EU Member states. The findings of 
this paper have significant implications for the lobbying activities of 
the NMS’s, for the weighting of the pollution burden in the New 
Europe and for future constitutional debates. 
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INTORDUCTION 
From an environmental perspective, the 
introduction of new and rigorous envi-
ronmental standards in any region of the 
world is a welcome change. Yet the uni-
versalizing of national-level standards to 
supra- or international levels or their 
imposition on economically less developed 
states brings with it a unique set of 
problems specific to the interests of both 
developed and developing states. This 
paper emphasizes the latter – the conse-
quences of imposing supranational stan-
dards on less developed economies – and 
asks what effect the exportation of 
European Union (EU) environmental pol-
icy will have on the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEEC’s). 
This paper assesses the consequences 
of pursuing highly centralized EU envi-
ronmental policy that reflects the inter-
ests of the more economically advanced 
and politically powerful EU Member 
states. Imposed upon less advanced 
economies, highly centralized EU policies 
are likely to have distortionary effects 
that outweigh or negate expected bene-
fits. The top-down imposition of EU 
standards may in particular result in 
significant adjustment costs for countries 
not involved in the original adoption of 
legislation. Pressures to conform to EU 
environmental regulations may thus result 
in the misallocation and diversion of 
scarce resources. Moreover, such regula-
tions often imply competitive standards 
not present in CEE. This paper questions 
the notion of positive leverage, suggesting 
instead that state and/or sectoral inter-
ests and relative power motivate policy 
integration in the EU. With the Eastern 
(and previous) Enlargement(s), newcomer 
states were primarily policy-takers, un-
able to influence or modify the contours 
of the EU policy framework. 
The centralization of policy at the EU 
level strengthens the ability of more 
powerful states to shape policy outcomes 
in ways that are less advantageous to 
New Member and less advanced states. 
The imposition of EU level environmental 
policy is advantageous to Western inter-
ests for several reasons: 1) it allows 
Western industry to control the impact 
of competition with firms that might oth-
erwise benefit from weaker environ-
mental regulation; 2) it favors the inter-
ests of Western environmental technology 
producers by broadening their markets;1 
3) and reductions in transboundary pol-
lution further benefit Western interests. 
In this respect, the ability to download 
Western policy preferences onto CEE 
yields explicit benefits for Western states. 
This analysis raises important concerns 
for newcomer states compelled to shoul-
der the burden of adjustment, in par-
ticular regarding the economic conse-
quences for less competitive firms, the 
potential diversion of resources from 
other pressing local, regional or national 
needs. 
The findings of this analysis have im-
plications for a broad range of academic 
literature. For one, this analysis raises 
questions about the political and policy-
making effects of relative power in the 
EU decision-making process, suggesting 
the need for more thorough constitu-
tional reforms. For another, this analysis 
raises important questions regarding the 
debate on subsidiarity. For a third, this 
analysis has important implications for 
the structure and content of supra- and 
international environmental agreements. 
Finally, by suggesting that states and 
groups within states have a powerful 
impact on the policy-making process, this 
article provides strong support for an 
intergovernmental approach to European 
integration. It goes one step further, 
                                                 
1 Gille, for example, has pointed to the interests 
of Western environmental technology producers 
in selling their technologies to CEEC’s. The esti-
mated magnitude of the “environmental market” 
was some $700 million for 1997 and rising 
(Gille, 2004: 126-7). 
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however, in suggesting that bargained 
outcomes are not necessarily advanta-
geous for all concerned. 
This paper proceeds as follows. The 
first section addresses the theoretical 
problems resulting from overly central-
ized control of environmental policy-
making. The second section discusses the 
current state of the environment in CEE 
and analyzes the impact of importing EU 
environmental legislation. The third sec-
tion discusses the compatibility of EU en-
vironmental policy with Central and East 
European priorities and needs. The final 
section concludes. 
1) THE PROBLEM OF 
CENTRALIZED CONTROL 
Some argue that the EU’s positive lever-
age has and will encourage beneficial 
changes to the legal and economic 
framework in CEE (Moravcsik and Va-
chudova, 2003: 47; Vachudova, 2002). 
Most authors in this general framework 
suggest the degree of change pursued by 
the CEEC’s (in terms of democracy or 
environmental regulation) has been lever-
aged with the carrot of EU membership. 
Others argue that EU governance repre-
sents a significant check on CEE govern-
ance. In this regard, the participation of 
EU governments makes CEE governments 
more accountable and ensures a proper 
transition toward democracy and/or 
stronger environmental regulation.2 Fi-
nally, the carrot of EU membership is 
often thought to have provided strong 
motivations for governments to rapidly 
pursue EU environmental policy in order 
to appear more prepared for EU mem-
bership (Slocock, 1996: 508), or to have 
strengthened the hand of environmental 
                                                 
2 Kovách (Interview) for example, argues in 
more general terms. Lynch (2000) builds an ar-
gument around environmental regulation and 
compliance. 
ministries pursuing strong environmental 
agendas (Slocock, 1999: 157). 
Counterarguments are less frequently 
considered. Pavlínek and Pickles suggest 
the centralization of policy-making at the 
national level under Communism had 
disastrous consequences for the protec-
tion of the environment. Soviet era “cen-
tralization” disrupted patterns of envi-
ronmental protection and sustainable de-
velopment cultivated over centuries by 
local village assemblies. The introduction 
of centralized, bureaucratic and authori-
tarian control likewise brought in nation-
ally appointed officials from other re-
gions with little local knowledge or ex-
pertise. With little declining local knowl-
edge, the history of local development 
and expertise was typically lost on the 
new command economy form of eco-
nomic and political management (2000: 
75-79). This, coupled with the communist 
era’s commitment to increasing output at 
any price did not augur well for the 
environment (ibid: Ch. 4). 
EU membership pulls the CEEC’s in 
contradictory directions. On the one 
hand, both the EU and CEE governments 
are democratic. Thus despite increasing 
levels of centralization, there are more 
mechanisms by which countries – and 
groups and individuals within countries – 
are able to participate in the policy-
making process. Moreover, since it is 
always possible for locally-based indi-
viduals or local governments to bring 
national governments before the Euro-
pean Court of Justice (ECJ) for failure to 
comply with EU legislation, the EU may 
actually favor local and individual forms 
of political autonomy and control. On 
the other hand, where Communist era 
policy mismatch occurred in part due to 
the degree of centralization of political 
power at the national level, the current 
potential for policy mismatch is com-
pounded by the delegation of environ-
mental authority to the supranational EU 
level. 
EU accession further creates the po-
tential for policy mismatch between local 
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needs and supranational policy demands. 
For one, CEE needs and demands were 
not included in the original formulation 
of EU environmental policy goals. For 
another, while membership negotiations 
allowed for delays in complying with EU 
regulations, no CEEC’s were permitted to 
opt out of individual policies. For a 
third, while some suggest the CEEC’s will 
have more political power once inside 
the EU, several caveats must be consid-
ered. Frequent discussion of the EU’s 
democratic deficit suggests there are po-
tential limitations to the ability of indi-
viduals, groups and possibly even states 
to influence the making of EU environ-
mental policy. Weak civil society in CEE 
is likely to further limit local responsive-
ness. Finally, in Hungary (and presuma-
bly in other CEEC’s) most EU environ-
mental legislation was introduced via 
government decree, not parliamentary 
deliberation, raising questions about the 
degree of legitimacy such policies enjoy.3 
Centralization at ever higher levels of 
delegated authority may thus result in 
significant policy mismatch relative to the 
local, regional or even state level.4 The 
1992 UN Conference on Environment and 
Development concluded that strategies of 
sustainable development are best organ-
ized at the local level, since this method 
provides assurances that environmental 
initiatives are better adapted to local 
needs and more likely to serve sustain-
able development goals (UNCED, 1992). 
As Mungiu-Pippidi (2000) notes, the 
“one-size-fits-all” nature of EU policy 
may pose problems for CEE countries 
that are quite different one from the 
other and again from EU member states. 
Pavlínek and Pickles further suggest that 
the blind introduction of EU environ-
                                                 
3 In the Hungarian case, for example, greater 
than 50% of EU-related environmental regulations 
were passed by government decree.  
4 Dahl (1994) argues that the delegation of deci-
sion-making authority to ever higher (more su-
pranational) levels reduces the ability of individ-
ual citizens to influence the policy-making proc-
ess, necessarily reducing democratic responsive-
ness. 
mental regulation without promoting CEE 
“alternatives” may be problematic, warn-
ing against “international competitiveness 
and global market” issues overshadowing 
the needs of the local environment 
(2000: 297). 
To some degree the world’s pollution 
problems bear striking resemblance from 
country to country, providing strong in-
centives for universal policy goals. Car-
bon-based power plants, for example, 
produce very large shares of total na-
tional SO2 emissions.
5 And many argue 
that nuclear power is problematic in any 
country. Motor vehicles – in particular 
in congested urban settings – produce 
significant shares of CO and NOx emis-
sions. Further, transboundary pollution 
problems, in particular, provide strong 
incentives for the centralization of policy-
making. Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
and global warming provides a highly 
relevant example. 
Though one might argue that similar 
environmental regulations serve all coun-
tries well, countries at different levels of 
economic development have different en-
ergy needs and differing shares of re-
sources with which to produce that en-
ergy. Moreover, variation in levels of 
economic development are further linked 
both to the relative degree of technologi-
cal sophistication – in part due to the 
ability to afford advanced technologies. 
Thus while less developed economies 
might aspire to more environmental pro-
tection, they may lack the know-how, the 
necessary technology and/or the required 
investment resources. 
Bhagwati (1994) provides two basic 
criticisms of supranational policy solu-
tions. First he argues that countries 
might be expected to have different 
needs and preferences regarding the ap-
propriate mix of environmental policies. 
Thus, environmental policy should fall 
within the purview of national govern-
                                                 
5 In 2000, even with one nuclear power plant 
producing 40% of Hungarian energy needs, 
Hungarian carbon-based power plants produced 
72.3% of total SO2 emissions (Ellison, 2006b). 
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ments and not international policy-
makers. Second, he argues that the in-
troduction of universalized standards 
may erode any comparative advantage 
enjoyed by individual countries. The im-
position of such standards frequently oc-
curs at the behest of producer groups in 
more advanced countries who hope to 
“level-the-playing-field”. Thus exporting 
developed country policies may entail 
significant concessions on the part of de-
veloping countries in competitiveness 
terms.6 
Börzel (2002) argues that EU-level 
regulatory standards are typically not 
well adapted to the interests and needs 
of less advanced economies,7 forcing 
these countries, like the CEEC’s, to be-
come “policy-takers”. Börzel (2003, 
2002), building on the work of Lieffer-
ink and Andersen (1998), finds that 
states with more advanced environmental 
policies are likely to be “pace-setters” in 
the promotion of EU-level environmental 
policy. Acting as agenda-setters, the 
more advanced states impose their envi-
ronmental agenda on laggard states, 
thereby offsetting the costs of competition 
with less environmentally rigorous states 
and reducing costs that might arise from 
setting different norms or guidelines. Of 
course, the imposition (and enforcement) 
of stricter environmental regulations may 
                                                 
6 Realists typically view the adoption of universal 
environmental standards as unlikely, even across 
countries at similar levels of economic develop-
ment. The realist approach to international envi-
ronmental agreements presents a relatively pessi-
mistic outlook on the potential conclusion of such 
agreements. Competing and conflicting interests 
of states (and or domestic interests groups within 
states) are typically the source of these problems. 
States not likely to benefit from such arrange-
ments are typically coerced or leveraged into 
them, either through the use of side-payments or 
through the exercise of influence (Sprinz and 
Vaahtoranta, 1994). 
7 Aguilar-Fernández notes that EU policy failed to 
respond to the environmental needs of the for-
mer cohesion countries. While EU policy focuses 
on “air pollution, waste management, control of 
chemical substances, and so on”, the former co-
hesion states were more concerned about “soil 
erosion, desertification, and forest fires” (1994: 
104-5). 
have a negative impact on the competi-
tive advantage of less advanced coun-
tries. As Börzel (2003: 205-6) and Agui-
lar-Fernández (1994: 114-5) note, the re-
sult was that the cooperation of the 
Southern states on EU environmental pol-
icy was purchased with Cohesion fund 
spending on environmental investments.  
In keeping with this example of side-
payments, Baumol and Oates, suggest 
that countries affected by transboundary 
pollution but dependent on trade might 
effectively persuade other countries to 
reduce their emissions by offering to 
share in the subsidization of environ-
mental investments (1988: 280-281). This 
approach however runs into problems 
regarding the principal sources of pollu-
tion. The definition of “heavy polluters” 
depends – in part – on how emissions 
are measured. Based on total output 
(GDP), less developed economies are the 
heavy polluters. Measured however in 
per capita terms, the results are no 
longer so clear-cut. As demonstrated be-
low, in some cases the CEEC’s continue 
to produce higher levels of pollution 
than Western Europe. But in the majority 
of cases – in particular after more than 
a decade of transition to market econo-
mies – the reverse is now true.8 
A potentially more meaningful model 
– based on something akin to but radi-
cally different from the EU’s current pol-
luter pays principal – might be a per-
capita emission’s tax on Western states 
for their “use” of the environment. States 
could be required to pay a graduated 
tax on national-level emissions such that 
producing higher per capita emissions 
results in a higher tax, with some dis-
counting for the level of economic devel-
opment. A model using national level per 
capita emission requirements might even 
be combined with the current “point-
                                                 
8 OECD countries consume approximately 10 
times more fossil fuel energy than developing 
countries. And they produce 68% of the world’s 
industrial waste while accounting for only 16% of 
the world’s population (Stanners and Bourdeau, 
1995: 312). Similar imbalances can be noted for 
world emissions or natural resource consumption. 
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source” or firm-level strategy of fining 
individual firms for high pollution output 
– in particular where such intensity has 
negative implications for the surrounding 
local environment. Revenues from these 
taxes/fines could be placed in a fund 
and made available for pollution reduc-
ing investments or perhaps for the fund-
ing and development of bio-diversity re-
gions in Europe.9 Ideally such a fund 
might also be made available for invest-
ments that reduce reliance on either 
harmful chemicals or natural resources, 
improve energy efficiency or for the de-
velopment of renewable energy sources.  
Political power structures at more 
centralized levels, however, are presuma-
bly the principal impediment to introduc-
ing a policy that favors the interests of 
small, less advanced states. The proposal 
of a tax on advanced country use of the 
environment – though in the interest of 
the less advanced CEEC’s and possibly 
other states – is presumably less palat-
able to more advanced EU member 
states. This logic extends as well to the 
interests of industry in the more and less 
advanced countries of the European Un-
ion. Thus for example, the chemical and 
other industries in Western Europe had 
a strong interest in insisting upon a 
“level-playing field” in the Single Market 
– meaning that CEE firms should be 
subject to the same environmental re-
strictions as other EU member state 
firms. Moreover, due to the relative pol-
lution-intensity of firms in CEE, firm-level 
commitments to pollution reduction favor 
Western firms.10 The CEEC’s, on the 
                                                 
9 Ironically, a similar fund was eliminated in 
Hungary. The system of “product charges” – a 
consumer tax on the sale of environmentally 
hazardous products to create an environmental 
investment fund – was considered a “subsidy” 
and the EU required the program’s elimination as 
one of the conditions of membership (see Gille, 
2004: 130). 
10 Western firms frequently lobbied hard to en-
sure this “level playing-field” (Ellison, 2001: Ch. 
4). The German Chemical Industry Association, 
for example, published a position paper on the 
consequences of enlargement, pointing to the po-
tential for “’environmental dumping’” posed by 
other hand, would benefit from national-
level per capita emission restrictions.  
The imposition of EU environmental 
law from the current EU member states 
to CEE fails to consider the status quo 
gap between Western and Central and 
Eastern Europe. Thus the impact – envi-
ronmental, financial and competitive – of 
EU environmental legislation is likely to 
be much greater. Moreover, the EU has 
typically been either resistant or insensi-
tive to local, regional or state-level con-
cerns and resisted negotiating amend-
ments to the acquis. Few or no conces-
sions were made on existing EU policy, 
despite the frequent variable geometry of 
EU regulations as applied to the OMS’s.11 
In this regard, asymmetrical bargaining 
power may have compelled the NMS’s to 
accept an agreement not always in their 
best interest (Ellison, 2006a). 
The consequences of adopting EU en-
vironmental legislation are several. The 
first is the potential lack of attention 
paid to local, regional or even state level 
environmental needs, preferences and 
interests. The second is the potentially 
negative consequence for economic com-
petitiveness or local and national envi-
ronmental needs of imposing more ad-
vanced country environmental policies on 
less developed economies. The third is 
the likely erosion of any positive local or 
national legacies in the wake of the 
wholesale adoption of EU environmental 
policy. Finally, though beyond the pa-
rameters of this essay, EU policy domi-
nance may ultimately weaken CEE civil 
society and NGO’s, thereby influencing 
the ability of CEEC’s to develop inde-
pendent social movements rooted in the 
                                                                          
weaker CEE regulations (Ellison, 2001: 178; VCI, 
1995). 
11 On a considerable number of EU regulations, 
for example Economic and Monetary Union, the 
Schengen Agreement and others, individual states 
have insisted upon various opt-outs, exceptions 
or concessions. However, the willingness of EU 
member states to accept such arrangements has 
typically not included matters related to competi-
tion and the smooth functioning of the Single 
Market. 
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advocacy and defense of local, regional 
and state level environmental interests 
(Ellison, 2004). One potential conse-
quence is that the resources and atten-
tion necessary to successfully combat lo-
cal regional and state environmental is-
sues have been diverted to centrally-
determined policy goals only partially 
adequate to dealing with local, regional 
and state-level needs and interests.12 
2) REFLECTIONS ON THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS IN 
CENTRAL EUROPE 
The argument that EU membership drives 
positive environmental change in Central 
and Eastern Europe rests on a number 
of mistaken assumptions. As the follow-
ing paragraphs argue, many of the re-
cent improvements in CEE emissions were 
frequently the result of other factors. 
Surprisingly, the CEEC’s all exhibit a 
moderate record of reducing emissions 
even during the period 1980-1990 – i.e. 
before the fall of the East Bloc. The EU’s 
evaluation of CEE environmental needs 
tends to suggest an exaggerated sense of 
urgency not generally reflected in per 
capita emissions figures. One of the 
more undesirable impacts of having to 
adopt the EU regulatory framework is 
the undue impact on end-of-pipe over 
other forms of emissions reductions. 
Years of Soviet-style production strate-
gies placed a significant environmental 
burden on the CEEC’s.13 By the 1990’s, 
approximately 100% of the forests in the 
Northern and Eastern Bohemian region 
                                                 
12 The concept of resource diversion extends to 
the administrative level. Ministries have seen sub-
stantial resources diverted to the EU membership 
drive and away from other ministerial duties. 
13 For an excellent overview of the environmental 
legacy left by the previous socialist systems, see 
Pavlínek and Pickles (2000: Ch. 3). 
were damaged.14 Until the beginning of 
the Transition period, these countries en-
gaged only marginally in environmental 
protection. Measured in per capita 
terms, 1980 SO2 emissions in the Czech 
Republic were 17 times (measured as a 
share of GDP 24 times) those in West 
Germany (Horak, 2001: 314). Such com-
parisons are prone to exaggeration. In 
the 1980’s, major cities in CEE – apart 
from Prague, Zagreb and Bucharest – 
exhibited SO2 levels similar to those in 
Western Europe. In many respects, the 
CEE pollution burden resembled Western 
Europe’s before the West began to focus 
more attention on the environment. Even 
some of the most polluted regions have 
parallels in the West of the 1950’s and 
60’s (2001: 43-4). 
As demonstrated by the data below, 
the reduction of CEE air emissions re-
veals a remarkably successful reversal. 
While EU membership requirements may 
have played a role, democratization, the 
introduction of market economies, the 
decline of heavy industry (primarily coal 
and steel)15 and agriculture, privatization, 
FDI and the shift from coal to natural 
gas heating systems likewise have signifi-
cant explanatory power. Separating out 
the exact role of each of these factors is 
problematic. The emergence of democ-
racy in 1989, the adoption of markets, 
privatization and increasing openness to 
FDI, initial changes in environmental pol-
icy and the decline in heavy industry all 
occurred quite early, long before EU 
membership negotiations – begun in 
March, 1998 – had much of an impact 
on national governments in Central and 
Eastern Europe. 
                                                 
14 By 1990, an average of some 58.9% of the 
Czech Republic’s forests had been damaged (Pav-
línek and Pickles, 2000: 61). In Hungary (with 
lower SO2 emissions) some 22% of forests were 
damaged (Powell, Kaderják and Verkoijen, 1997: 
131).  
15 Several transition survivors – power plants, oil 
refining, district heating, pharmaceuticals, chemi-
cal, cement, sugar and some remaining steel 
production facilities – remain significant emitters. 
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The full adoption of the acquis com-
munautaires (the existing body of EU 
legislation) as a requirement of EU mem-
bership provided incentives for environ-
mental improvements. However, the rise 
of environmental concerns in CEE pre-
dates the transition. Organizations such 
as the Hungarian Bird Life association, 
DunaKör (the Danube Circle) and others 
were founded in the 70’s and 80’s. 
While social movements lost their mo-
mentum during the transition in the 
90’s, many of their leaders became ac-
tive in political parties and/or CEE Min-
istries of the Environment. Some 100 
members of the DunaKör were able to 
win parliamentary seats in 1990.16 Local 
forces thus began to shape the CEE envi-
ronment before these countries even be-
gan pursuing the goal of EU member-
ship.17 While the CEEC’s did not have a 
stellar record of environmental protection 
prior to 1989, environmental legislation 
was gradually adopted in these countries 
over the 60’s, 70’s and 80’s. Moreover, 
at least part of the problem in CEE was 
less the formulation of environmental leg-
islation, than its inconsistent implementa-
tion and failed enforcement.18 
Little attention is typically paid to the 
record of emissions’ reductions prior to 
the collapse of CEE governments in 1989. 
Though the soviet era ideology of rapidly 
rising output clearly outweighed concern 
for the environment (Pavlínek and Pick-
les, 2000: Ch. 4; Szirmai, 1997: 25), the 
CEEC’s did in fact introduce environ-
mental legislation (Pavlínek and Pickles, 
                                                 
16 See for example the brief history of the Hun-
garian Green Democrats (www.zd.hu). 
17 The history of green social movements in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe and Hungary is well-
documented. For a brief overview of the litera-
ture and the major steps in green activism in 
Hungary and Central and Eastern Europe, see 
Ellison (2004: 17-24). 
18 See for example Kerekes (1993: 146) and Gille 
(2004, 2000). Pavlínek and Pickles provide an 
excellent overview of environmental legislation in 
some CEEC’s (including Hungary) both before 
and after 1989 (2000: Ch. 8). As Szirmai notes, 
Hungary, like many of the CEEC’s, began intro-
ducing environmental legislation in the 60’s and 
70’s (1997: 25). 
2000: Ch. 8) and, as demonstrated be-
low, reduce emissions. From among the 
CEEC’s, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and 
Romania (as well as the Russian Federa-
tion) signed the 1979 Geneva Convention 
on Long-Range Transboundary Pollution.19 
As Kaderják and Lehoczki point out, 
Hungary successfully reduced its SO2 
emissions by 54% between 1980 and 
1993. While a significant share of these 
emission reductions were achieved at the 
cost of introducing nuclear power, sig-
nificant reductions were also due to cuts 
in industry and household SO2 output 
(1997: 111-112). 
Regulations in effect before the adop-
tion of EU environmental policy have 
frequently been eliminated, regardless of 
their potential advantages. Perhaps one 
of the most egregious cases involves 
Hungary’s extensive system of industrial 
waste collection. Though responsible for 
cataloguing all types of industrial waste 
produced by individual firms and finding 
alternative uses, this system was aban-
doned in 1992. Inefficient and far from 
perfect, this program represented a po-
tentially valuable store of information 
and potentially could have been used for 
developing further alternative uses for 
waste (Gille, 2004, 2000). Moreover, as 
Gille (2004) notes, Hungary much ex-
ceeded Western Europe in its degree of 
hazardous waste recycling. Despite this 
fact, Hungary has completely shifted over 
to waste collection systems and has 
ceased recycling industrial waste.20 
Since the transition, the introduction 
of market economies and the elimination 
of state subsidies have had a significant 
impact on emission levels. For one, the 
                                                 
19 See the Convention’s website: 
(http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/status/lrtap_st.ht
m). 
20 Gille likewise notes a number of smaller pro-
grams that were eliminated early on. For one, a 
long-standing policy of deposits on packaging 
was eliminated. For another, deposit and refund 
systems for bottles and batteries were likewise 
weakened by the move to a market system and 
the introduction of new packaging materials 
(2000: 217). 
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gradual liberalization of the energy sec-
tor produced strong incentives to reduce 
power consumption and promote energy 
efficiency. Similar effects resulted from 
rising water prices. In agriculture, the 
elimination of subsidies on fertilizers had 
a significant impact on their use – in 
particular in the early 90’s. Both privati-
zation and FDI further had a significant, 
positive impact on the environmental per-
formance of industry. For one, ‘separat-
ing the regulated from the regulators’ 
(Páczi and Kaderják, 1997: 62) strength-
ens the role of the state as the enforcer 
of environmental regulation.21 As one in-
terviewee suggested, old socialist era 
firms were able to dump industrial 
waste into rivers and streams almost at 
will.22 With privatization and FDI, new 
environmental permits required connec-
tions to the industrial sewage system and 
placed important restrictions on the dis-
charge of emissions and other pollutants 
– frequently in line with existing EU 
guidelines (see also Reiniger, 1994). In 
addition, many Western firms imported 
environmental technology, thereby intro-
ducing cleaner production methods and 
contributing to improvements in the CEE 
environment. Finally, the transition to-
ward more service-rich economies has 
likewise had a positive impact on CEE 
pollution levels (Table 1). 
Per capita, in most pollution catego-
ries, the CEEC’s now produce less pollu-
tion than West European countries. Sig-
nificant differences between Western and 
Central and Eastern Europe do however 
persist in the “efficient” production of 
                                                 
21 Initially the prices of privatized firms were 
kept low in exchange for commitments to reduce 
emissions. The Hungarian government likewise set 
up a so-called “environmental clean-up guarantee 
fund”. Over the early years of transition, Hun-
garian privatization law was gradually strength-
ened – in particular in 1992 – to make envi-
ronmental audits obligatory for new investors. 
This was paralleled with liability commitments to 
cover the costs of environmental problems to 
emerge after the privatization had taken place 
(Páczi and Kaderják, 1997: 54, 57, 62-3). 
22 Many of these sites are now the target of 
clean-up programs organized by local NGO’s, 
and national and local governments. 
pollution (or pollution “intensity”) and 
thus in higher point source forms of pol-
lution: per unit of GDP, the CEEC’s pro-
duce greater amounts of pollution than 
Western countries. Individual production 
firms in CEE tend to be more pollution 
intensive than in the West. Moreover, the 
more geographically concentrated and 
the closer pollution sources are to 
densely populated areas, the greater the 
human impact of pollution generated by 
power plants or industrial firms. One 
example is the sulfur dioxide (SO2), ni-
trogen oxide (NOx) and carbon dioxide 
(CO2) emissions of large combustion 
plants – most of which are power 
plants.23 
EU directives are likely to have a 
strong impact on point source emissions. 
On average, some 74% of SO2 emissions 
are produced by these large point 
sources.24 In particular, the EU directive 
dealing with the emissions of large com-
bustion plants (of which there are ap-
proximately 29 in Hungary), requires 
that these plants reduce emissions below 
certain “limit values”. Since many of the 
largest emitters are in CEE,25 this direc-
tive will have an important impact on 
pollution reduction in the region.26 On 
the other hand, the burden of adjust-
                                                 
23 In Estonia, 80.5% of SO2 emissions come from 
two thermoelectric power plants (World Bank, 
1999: 84). 
24 Large point sources are responsible for much 
smaller, though still substantial, shares of the 
production of NOx (27%) and CO2 (25%) emis-
sions (Barrett, 2000: 5). 
25 From the Western countries, Spain, the UK, 
the former East Germany, Italy, Belgium and the 
Netherlands (in that order) have some plants with 
very high emissions levels, and a larger number 
of West European countries have plants with 
emissions levels among the top 600 emitters. 
However the intensity of emissions and the share 
of firms among the top 100 emitters is much 
higher in Central and Eastern Europe (Barrett, 
2000).  
26 Hungary’s transition period on the Large 
Combustion Plant Directive ran out in January, 
2005. According to the Hungarian Energy Office, 
all Hungarian power plants are now in compli-
ance with this directive. Other countries – the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and 
Slovakia – have longer deadlines for compliance 
(see Table 5). 
  
13
ment with regard to this directive is 
considerably imbalanced. Many of the 
large combustion plants in Western 
Europe are already compliant while the 
opposite was initially true in CEE. Thus, 
although the CEEC’s did not participate 
in the making of this directive or setting 
the target date, they were nonetheless 
required to meet the same deadline.27 
The calculation of pollution intensities 
as a share of GDP harbors a specific 
bias in favor of EU member states and 
suggests an exaggerated sense of ur-
gency.28 While the observation that 
OMS’s are able to produce more GDP 
per unit of pollution provides an impor-
tant reference, it likewise conceals sev-
eral important points. For one, as evident 
in Table 1, the OMS’s service sector is 
larger and contributes significantly to 
overall GDP (in particular in the finan-
cial, insurance and banking sectors). For 
another, the mix of goods produced in 
the EU member states is less dependent 
upon high pollution producing goods. 
Regarding fertilizer and pesticide use, a 
very small share of OMS production is 
agricultural. Pollution levels expressed as 
a share of GDP have the perverse effect 
of suggesting that absolute amounts of 
pollution are lower in Western Europe 
when the reverse is true. Moreover, such 
figures obscure the total amount of pol-
lution in individual countries and its po-
                                                 
27 Although for Hungary the compliance deadline 
with the EU Directive on Large Combustion 
Plants is listed as a “transitional period”, the 
deadline for compliance is in fact the same for 
all EU countries. According to the Directive, all 
countries must achieve significant reductions by 
Jan. 1st, 2008. Hungary has a transition period 
until 2004. Only Estonia (2015), Lithuania 
(20015) and Poland (2017) obtained transitional 
periods beyond 2008. From the perspective of EU 
member states, the limit values set by this direc-
tive are liberal and most plants operating in the 
EU as of 1995 had successfully complied with the 
limit values set for new plants built after 2003. 
This is not the case for the CEEC’s (see Barrett, 
2000). 
28 I am indebted to a discussion with Karoly Kiss 
(Corvinus University, Budapest). 
tential impact on individuals or the sur-
rounding environment.29 
As evident in Table 2, the CEEC’s 
produce significantly more pollution per 
unit of GDP than the OMS’s. Apart the 
odd exception, this remains true in 
2002, though many of the CEEC’s have 
made remarkable advances. Reductions in 
SO2 levels have been the most pro-
nounced and have migrated toward 
Western levels. Reductions in NOx levels, 
while not quite as pronounced, have be-
gun to approximate Western levels. Lev-
els of CO and CO2 still remain well 
above those in Western Europe. 
However, as evident from Table 3, 
when emissions data is compared to the 
total population, the CEEC’s emit much 
less per person than Western states. The 
only case in which this is not true is the 
emission of SOx (though compared to the 
US, only Bulgaria and Estonia produce 
more). In the remaining cases, the 
CEEC’s produce lower levels per person 
than the Western states – in particular 
with respect to NOx and CO2. 
Between 1980 and 2002, the CEEC’s 
exhibit a strikingly successful record of 
emissions reductions (Table 4). While the 
lion’s share fall in the transition period 
(1990–2002), almost all of the CEEC’s 
likewise reduced emissions between 1980 
and 1990. A few failed to do this with 
respect to CO (the Czech Republic, Esto-
nia, Hungary and Slovenia) and NOx 
(Slovakia and Slovenia). But all of the 
CEEC’s achieved reductions in SOx out-
put. While western reductions in SOx 
output are more than twice as high dur-
ing the same period, given the conven-
tional image of the CEEC’s, this result is 
surprising. 
In per capita terms, the severity of 
environmental abuse in CEE appears 
overstated. In several of the above in-
stances, the EU would be happy to attain 
                                                 
29 An even more appropriate method of stan-
dardizing pollution levels might be by square 
miles. This measure however only results in sig-
nificant differences in the Scandinavian countries 
and the US. 
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per capita levels similar to those in CEE. 
This approach suggests that the focus on 
a strategy of emission limit values (the 
current practice in EU environmental 
regulation) and thus “end-of-pipe” solu-
tions (e.g. the introduction of scrubbers 
or other pollution reducing devices) may 
not always be the most meaningful strat-
egy – in particular for CEE.  
3) PRIORITY ALLOCATION, 
RESOURCE TRANSFER AND 
RESOURCE DIVERSION IN THE 
MANAGEMENT OF THE 
CENTRAL AND EAST 
EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT 
The expectation that EU membership 
might help the CEEC’s resolve their envi-
ronmental problems is problematic on 
multiple levels. Not only does this tend to 
ignore, as argued above, the record of 
environmental success in CEE, it also fails 
to account – as argued below – for the 
following. For one, the EU itself tends to 
promote economic growth over environ-
mental concerns. As one of the principal 
engines of globalization, the EU more 
frequently advocates a level playing field 
– emphasizing competitiveness concerns – 
than sustainable development priorities. 
For another, to-date the EU has offered 
only minimal financial support for envi-
ronmental expenditure in CEE. Thus 
much of the burden of adjusting to EU 
environmental regulation has fallen on 
the shoulders of enterprising CEE gov-
ernments and industry. Finally, the sheer 
complexity, scope and magnitude of the 
tasks CEE governments continue to face 
– coupled with high environmental costs 
– is likely to lead to considerable re-
source diversion from other economic, 
social and even environmental priorities. 
 
Economy vs. environment 
 
Although the EU claims an interest in 
sustainable development priorities,30 the 
EU is first and foremost an economic 
union.31 The impact of EU membership 
on the CEEC’s in the area of the envi-
ronment is much broader than merely 
the impact of adopting EU environmental 
regulation. As the engine of globalization, 
the EU’s Single Market legislation defends 
the basic logic of the market and gener-
ally prohibits attempts to soften its im-
pact where these obstruct the free 
movement of goods, capital and labor.32 
EU membership thus opens up CEE mar-
kets to EU products, economic activities 
and infrastructure developments, all of 
which may have significant impacts on 
the environment and which are increas-
ingly difficult to mitigate via national-
level legislation. Moreover, the CEEC’s 
largely joined the EU in the hopes of 
achieving these goals. Thus economic 
growth priorities frequently outweigh en-
vironmental concerns. 
The opening of markets and integra-
tion into the EU marketplace has thus 
had a distinctly Europeanizing impact 
upon the CEE environment. Moreover, 
the lion’s share of EU spending is de-
voted first to economic growth – in par-
ticular the development of infrastructure 
– and second to the protection or im-
provement of the environment. Not sur-
prisingly, these two goals frequently con-
flict with each other. The impact of eco-
                                                 
30 Sustainable development is mentioned 6 times 
in the Draft Constitutional Treaty approved in 
June 2004. This represents an attempt to inte-
grate this concept more firmly into the core of 
the EU’s environmental policy-making framework. 
Article 6 of the previous Treaty Establishing the 
European Community expressed a commitment to 
the goal of sustainable development. 
31 Environmental NGO’s have generally recognized 
this point. See for example Turning Green: Hun-
garian Greens on the EU (2003).  
32 In Article 177 cases, the European Court of 
Justice has frequently sided against national envi-
ronmental regulations based on EU directives that 
obstruct the free movement of goods (Cichowski, 
1998). 
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nomic over environmental priorities is 
tangible in debates surrounding the con-
siderable emphasis given to infrastructure 
projects. The building of highways, the 
construction of waste incinerators and 
other EU-funded projects – along with 
their nationally and locally based elec-
toral constituencies – are occasionally at 
odds with the interests of national 
and/or EU-based environmental groups.33  
EU environmental regulations are not 
always up to the task of mitigating the 
impact of the market. Western environ-
mental approaches typically have little 
impact on the upward spiral of produc-
tion and consumption. Thus one outcome 
of the introduction of market society and 
Western market integration is a dramatic 
expansion of consumer society and the 
inevitable rise in the production of waste. 
Considerable pressures come from EU-
driven infrastructure projects, such as 
the Trans-European Networks (TENS) and 
the related TINA programs focusing on 
Central and East European transport in-
frastructure development. And CEE gov-
ernments have clearly locked onto the 
TENS program as an opportunity to up-
grade and modernize their road and 
highway networks. Similar pressures arise 
from plans to turn the Danube water-
way into a major transport corridor with 
a minimum depth of 2.5 meters.34 EU 
membership will further have a consider-
able impact on the intensification of ag-
ricultural production in CEE and thus 
ultimately the increasing use of commer-
cial fertilizers. Though this is not yet a 
                                                 
33 The CEE Bankwatch Network recently published 
a report outlining environmental objections to 
some 22 CEE projects intended to involve EU 
funding during the 2007-2013 Framework Per-
spective (www.bankwatch.org). 
34 Organizations such as the World Wildlife Fed-
eration (the Austrian branch), the Hungarian 
Greens and the Danube Settlement Alliance have 
been organizing conferences and lobbying the 
Hungarian government. These organizations sup-
port the rehabilitation of existing side-arms and 
the protection of some bottleneck areas that 
likewise tend to be ecological hotspots. They 
likewise oppose the deepening of the riverbed 
and favor the use of smaller and more modern 
forms of river transport. 
significant problem in CEE (at least com-
pared to Western Europe), more and 
more fertilizers are again being used as 
agriculture recovers.  
Urban sprawl and the related rise in 
the total number of motor vehicles are 
also considerable problems. Large tracts 
of land outside previous urban peripher-
ies have been rapidly devoured by the 
construction of new housing and com-
mercial outposts. Such developments raise 
questions that are – for the most part – 
going unaddressed by governments ab-
sorbed with other agendas. Such areas 
frequently lie outside existing public 
transportation networks – though in a 
few cases the public transportation net-
works have been modified to accommo-
date them commercial outposts. Thus, in 
order to commute into the cities or visit 
these commercial outposts, individuals 
are more likely to use passenger cars 
than public transportation. The rapid rise 
in the total number of passenger vehi-
cles, urban congestion and increased lev-
els of smog35 have generally not met 
with counter attempts to modernize and 
extend the availability of public transpor-
tation outside the existing and new 
commercial networks or to reduce the 
total burden on urban congestion.36 The 
lack of attention to public transportation 
and to urban congestion will only exac-
erbate these problems in the short and 
potentially also the long term.37 
                                                 
35 Between 1990 and 1999, the total number of 
vehicles per 1000 inhabitants increased by 64% 
(against only 27% in Western Europe) (based on 
data from the World Development Indicators 
Database, World Bank, 2005). Although the total 
number of vehicles per 1000 inhabitants is still 
significantly below that in Western Europe, this 
suggests things are likely to get worse before 
they get better. 
36 On zoning and urban congestion in Prague, 
see Beckmann: “Dysfunctional Decision-Making: 
The Battle for Prague’s Future” (Central Europe 
Review, Nov. 15th, 1999). This problem extends 
however to cities throughout CEE. 
37 According to the European Environmental 
Agency, transport related GHG emissions rose 
24% above base year levels between 1995 and 
2003 in the NMS, despite an initial 5% reduction 
from base year levels by 1995 (EEA, 2005: 19).  
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Accession-related decisions on compli-
ance with the EU regulatory framework 
likewise appear strongly driven by mar-
ket as opposed to environmental consid-
erations. The most derogation-heavy di-
rectives (see Table 5) involve the public 
sector: e.g. the treatment of urban 
wastewater (largely a public sector issue) 
and to the emissions of large combustion 
plants (public sector power plants had 
the highest emissions). The packaging 
and package waste directive – with pri-
vate and public sector spending compo-
nents38 – comes in a close third. More-
over, the total number of transitional 
periods requested often differs quite 
radically from the total number ap-
proved in the Accession Treaty. Accord-
ing to some government representatives, 
there were in fact significant pressures 
to reduce the overall number of re-
quests.  
Documents dealing with the negotia-
tion of the environmental chapter repeat-
edly emphasize the importance of ad-
dressing both “transboundary” issues and 
environmental issues likely to affect or 
“distort” economic competition in the EU. 
Moreover, Commission documents repeat-
edly insist that all new plants must com-
ply with EU regulations from the first 
day of production. Though the Commis-
sion invited CEE governments to develop 
systematic priorities and to identify “fi-
nancially viable” projects that “conform 
realistically to national afforda-
bility/borrowing” (European Commission, 
2001a: 7-8), transition periods were most 
readily granted where no competition or 
transboundary issues were evident. In 
sum, the pressures of EU accession re-
sulted in costs that – to some degree – 
are out of line with actual CEE needs, 
priorities or preferences. 
 
                                                 
38 Generally, the public sector is responsible for 
the collection and sorting of municipal packaging 
waste while the private sector is responsible for 
the collection of industrial packaging waste 
(European Commission, 2001b: iii). 
Cross-national resource transfer 
 
The fulfilment of EU-level environmental 
requirements imposes significant con-
straints that are compounded by the al-
ready difficult budgetary situation in 
many or most CEEC’s.39 The estimated 
costs of compliance with EU regulations 
are significant. While estimates have de-
clined over time, the total cost of com-
pliance for all CEEC’s is estimated at 
some 78 to 108 billion Euros (Table 6). 
Previous estimates have been as high as 
230 billion Euros. Of this sum, the EU 
has to-date only funded a small amount. 
For example, the CEE Cohesion Fund al-
location for the period 2004-2006 to-
taled 7.59 billion Euros. Only a fraction 
of this amount, however, was available 
for environmental projects.40 Previously 
the EU has granted some 3.1 billion Eu-
ros of support annually through other 
mechanisms such as the Phare Program, 
ISPA, and SAPARD (DANCEE, 2001: 43-
8). Of this amount, between 1995 and 
2000, 138.9 million Euros were appro-
priated for institution-building and 719.5 
million Euros were dedicated to environ-
mental projects. By the Commission’s own 
admission, pre-accession funding covered 
only 0.59% of total CEE environmental 
funding needs (Official Journal C167, 
2003: 4 Table 1, 8, Table 3). This re-
portedly pales in comparison to the sums 
granted the Cohesion Countries (Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain) (DANCEE, 
2001: 43-8). 
                                                 
39 In June 2004, six NMS’s were cited under the 
EU’s “excessive budget deficit” procedure and 
urged to bring their budgets into compliance 
with the EU Stability Pact (Euractiv.com, June 25, 
2004). The Czech Republic, Hungary and Slova-
kia continue to post sizable budget deficits rang-
ing from -4.6% to -5.9% (based on Eurostat 
online data). 
40 At least some of the Western assistance serves 
Western interests as well as CEE interests. Slo-
cock mentions, for example, that concerns about 
transboundary pollution have driven at least 
some assistance (1999: 154), while concerns 
about potential catastrophes have presumably 
driven programs dealing with CEE nuclear 
power. 
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Seen as a share of GDP, the total cost 
of compliance with EU environmental 
policy varies tremendously across indi-
vidual CEEC’s. The most serious case is 
Estonia, where cost estimates attain some 
70.4% of Estonia’s GDP. This estimate is 
followed by Bulgaria with 56.5% and 
Romania with 49% of GDP. Figures for a 
number of countries, in particular Slove-
nia, Lithuania and the Czech Republic, 
are less daunting. However, based on an 
estimated yearly government expenditure 
of 1% of GDP and an average annual 
economic growth rate of 3%, it would 
still take the Czech Republic some 9-12 
years to cover the costs of compliance 
with EU environmental regulations.41 Es-
tonia, Bulgaria and Romania will take 
much longer. 
Attempts have been made to compen-
sate for the lack of EU public spending 
through the promotion of private sector 
resources. The European Investment Bank 
(EIB) and the European Bank for Recon-
struction and Development (EBRD) have 
made subsidized loans available for en-
ergy efficiency improvements and report-
edly have even gone to the extent of 
seeking out and making recommenda-
tions to firms that might benefit from 
such investments.42 
Though total projected environmental 
spending figures for Framework Perspec-
tive 2007-2013 remain very preliminary, 
Bankwatch has put together estimates 
                                                 
41 A word of caution is necessary. For one, cur-
rent average government expenditure on the en-
vironment is less than 1% across all CEEC’s. For 
another, the likely rate of economic growth is 
difficult to predict. While across all CEEC’s, the 
average rate of economic growth from 1994-
2000 was approximately 3.5%, rates of economic 
growth have slowed somewhat in recent years. 
Third, the nominal cost of environmental invest-
ments will increase over time. In addition, the 
Commission’s estimates may either over or under-
estimate the costs of compliance (see also Inglis, 
2004: 136-7). Finally, additional environmental 
problems may yet be discovered. 
42 See the International Herald Tribune: “Squan-
dering Energy in the East” (June 2, 2006) and 
the EIB report “Environmental Lending in Central 
and Eastern Europe” (May, 2003). Between 1999 
and 2002, the EIB provided some 3.25 billion 
Euros in financing to CEEC’s (ibid, 2003: 5). 
based on individual country national de-
velopment plans. The amounts – though 
on the low end of total projected needs 
– are substantially greater than for pre-
vious periods (Table 7). Together with 
national co-financing expenditure, they 
are likely to facilitate significant progress 
in the direction of compliance with EU 
environmental requirements. However, 
due to the high expenditure require-
ments, it is unlikely all or most of the 
CEEC’s will be able to achieve full com-
pliance within the required transitional 
periods. 
 
Priority conflict, resource diversion and 
alternative strategies 
 
It is something of a truism to claim that 
the CEEC’s face the competing and po-
tentially conflicting demands of economic 
development and environmental protec-
tion. Coping with the problems of the 
environment is just one of many issues 
facing CEE governments. Transition to 
market economies, privatization, economic 
restructuring, as well as the general EU 
accession process equally burden CEE 
governments. Nor have these projects 
come to an end with the successful 
completion of the accession process. The 
projects of economic adjustment, restruc-
turing and above all convergence on 
Western levels of economic development 
are far from complete (see e.g. Ellison, 
2005). Currently, reform of the educa-
tion, healthcare and other public sectors 
is one of the principal tasks facing CEE 
governments. In this sense, multiple and 
potentially conflicting priorities are the 
letter of the day. 
The presence of conflicting priorities 
emanating from multiple levels of gov-
ernance – supranational, national and 
regional – increases both the likelihood 
and the consequences of resource diver-
sion. Moreover, such conflicting goals 
and priorities are an indicator of the 
difficulties CEEC’s are likely to have in 
allocating resources appropriately. For 
  
18 
the purposes of this paper, the burning 
question is to what extent EU-determined 
environmental requirements are the ap-
propriate alternatives for CEEC’s. Given 
current CEE pollution levels, EU-driven 
priorities and their attached costs at 
times appear exorbitant. Moreover, many 
of the market-driven effects of member-
ship go unchecked by the EU regulatory 
framework and the unintended conse-
quences of some EU environmental poli-
cies have occasionally had perverse ef-
fects.43 
The diversion of both financial and 
administrative resources away from local, 
regional and state-level priorities and 
concerns – in particular in the context 
of the relatively weak environmental or-
ganization of civil society – is likely to 
result in missed opportunities and even 
neglect. Given the tremendous effort and 
attention placed on EU compliance, it 
behooves researchers to analyze the 
negative side-effects of the focus on EU 
environmental priorities.  
Some of the more common examples 
of resource diversion and missed oppor-
tunities involve the development of roads 
over rail and the lack of attention paid 
to expanding public transportation. Some 
have argued that the CEEC’s have failed 
to build upon the positive legacy of the 
communist era, i.e. its development of 
public infrastructure, in particular rail-
roads, public bus and subway systems 
(see for example Ürge-Vorsatz, Paizs and 
Pesic, 2003: 262; Horak, 2001: 322). 
More effort could be put into improving 
the railway networks instead of shifting 
most freight transport from rail to 
                                                 
43 An interesting example is the introduction of 
“biomass” in energy production in CEE. While 
joint implementation investment projects have fa-
cilitated emissions reductions in some power 
plants, they have been replaced by biomass 
power plants that burn wood from local forests. 
This has raised interesting questions about the 
long-term sustainability of such energy production 
and likewise has obvious implications for the use 
of forests as future carbon sinks (see Ellison, 
2006b). 
road.44 District heating was likewise seen 
as an area with a potentially positive 
impact on the environment. Some 20% of 
the public is connected to district heating 
in Hungary and some 80% of apart-
ments in urban areas in Poland.45 Many 
alternatives could ultimately be men-
tioned; for example subsidizing the ac-
quisition of new more environmentally 
friendly trucks and buses could further 
have a significant impact on reducing 
ambient air pollution.  
Attention is directed in the following 
paragraphs to three alternatives. In view 
of the urgency of some point source 
forms of pollution, one alternative is to 
focus on hot spots – areas of high pol-
lution intensity having a serious impact 
on human health or the environment. 
Both per capita and end-of-pipe strate-
gies fail to target the more egregious 
cases of high pollution concentrations – 
in particular in proximity to urban 
population settings. High pollution inten-
sity and the regional concentration of 
economic activity in areas of high popu-
lation density had serious effects on the 
health of individuals and the surrounding 
environment. Average life expectancy at 
birth in Northern Bohemia was 10 years 
below the average in the more developed 
countries of Europe (Pavlínek and Pick-
les, 2000: 135). Similar statistics are 
cited for cancer rates, infant mortality 
and other illnesses (ibid: Ch. 6).46 
A second alternative is to focus on 
energy efficiency and technological up-
dating. Investments focused in particular 
on the relative pollution efficiency of 
                                                 
44 Some of the railroad lines have been im-
proved, in particular those that connect more 
important “corridors”, but most freight has still 
been shifted to roads. 
45 I am indebted here to discussions with the 
Diana Ürge-Vorsatz and Energy Club’s Gábor 
Takács. See also Ürge-Vorsatz, Paizs and Pesic 
(2003: 262).  
46 Powell, Kaderják and Verkoijen note that in 
Hungary, according to the National Institute of 
Public Health, 1 in 7 deaths and 1 in 24 disabili-
ties are caused by air pollution (1997: 131). 
Kerekes and Bulla likewise note health problems 
related to air pollution (1994: 96). 
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production, the reduction of energy re-
quirements, or possibly the discontinua-
tion of harmful chemicals and other pol-
lutants have specific advantages. While 
end-of-pipe vs. energy efficiency and 
technological change strategies have re-
ceived some attention in the literature, 
the impact on the EU’s approach toward 
CEE has been small. Moreover, as the 
pressure to comply with EU environ-
mental regulations has grown, the em-
phasis on technological updating and in-
creased efficiency has declined in favor 
of short-term end-of-pipe solutions. 
To take the case of energy production 
– a source of large shares of concen-
trated point-source SO2, NOx and CO2 – 
some argue that significant progress 
could have been achieved with a com-
bined strategy focused additionally on 
energy efficiency. Ürge-Vorsatz, Paizs 
and Pesic (2003) and others point out 
that far more energy is used per unit of 
GDP in CEE than in Western Europe. 
Encouraging more energy efficiency in 
industrial production and residential con-
sumption could result in considerable 
reductions of emissions.47 As of 1997, 
Hungary’s energy intensity was 3.5 times 
higher than the EU average and the 
Czech Republic and Poland was twice 
again as much energy as Hungary’s 
(ibid: 265).48 The potential benefits of an 
energy efficiency-based strategy seem to 
have dawned late on European authori-
ties. Yet according to a report commis-
sioned by the European Insulation Manu-
facturer’s Association, energy use per 
square meter is considerably higher in 
                                                 
47 Several studies, one published by the Hungar-
ian NGO Energy Club (Takacs, 2002), another 
published by the Danish Cooperation for Envi-
ronment in Eastern Europe (DANCEE, 2001: 15), 
point to the advantages of investments in energy 
and water efficiency. 
48 While Ürge-Vorsatz, Paizs and Pesic note that 
the partial introduction of market prices has led 
to overall improvements in energy intensity (of 
41% for Poland, 19% for the Czech Republic and 
22% for Hungary over the period 1989-2000), 
they argue further improvements require active 
government intervention and alternative strategies 
(2003: 265-6).  
CEE than in the OMS’s (Ecofys, 2006). 
The implications both for potential reduc-
tions of the above noted pollutants, as 
well as for overall greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions, are considerable.49 
“End-of-pipe” strategies have a dou-
bly-undesirable impact. For one, they 
make industry less competitive (by driv-
ing up prices) and for another, they are 
likely to result in the diversion of re-
sources away from energy efficiency in-
vestments. Similar observations have been 
made with regard to excessive water use 
and expenditures on wastewater treat-
ment plants (DANCEE, 2001: 15). In a 
similar manner, the production of waste 
is favored by EU policies that fail to 
adequately encourage recycling over the 
creation/extension of landfill capacity.50 
A third alternative is to focus more 
attention upon European strategies of 
emission and general pollution reductions 
based on per capita pollution measures. 
The following example of the Kyoto Pro-
tocol embodies most of the principal 
points raised in the paragraphs above 
and illustrates many of the problems of 
environmental management at the supra-
national level.  
 
The Kyoto Protocol  
 
The Kyoto Protocol and the establishment 
of limits on total national level GHG 
emissions provides one of the strongest 
examples of potential conflict between 
demands for economic growth and EU 
environmental regulation. As illustrated in 
Tables 4 and 8, the former cohesion 
countries Spain, Portugal, Greece and 
Ireland (but also to some extent Italy 
and Austria) have so far not been able 
                                                 
49 During the Communist era, energy and water 
prices (among other things) were heavily subsi-
dized, leading to inefficient consumption. In many 
ways, this legacy still remains to be exploited. 
50 Gille argues persuasively that the adoption of 
EU directives on waste management in Hungary 
led to the indiscriminate elimination of Hungarian 
policies of waste reuse and recycling (Gille, 
2004, 2000). 
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to reign in CO2 and GHG emissions. In 
fact, since the EU reached its decision on 
the Kyoto targets in April 2002, the 
OMS’s have for the most part observed 
increases rather than reductions in their 
total emissions. To-date, it is the NMS’s 
that have enabled the EU to make pro-
gress on its Kyoto targets. Over the en-
tire period from 1990-2004, the OMS’s 
only reduced their GHG emissions by 
approximately 0.9%, suggesting that the 
reversal of the growth–GHG nexus is no 
simple matter. With the help of the 
NMS’s, the EU2351 have managed to re-
duce GHG emissions by approximately 
7.4%. The addition of Bulgaria and Ro-
mania (as suggested by the data in Ta-
ble 4) will further improve this figure. 
It is more difficult to divine what this 
predicts for the possible emergence of a 
growth ceiling in the CEEC’s resulting 
from their Kyoto targets. Again, the 
former cohesion countries have far sur-
passed their original Kyoto targets and 
have a long way to go in order to im-
prove their current performance. More-
over, these countries along with Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Italy and 
Luxembourg, pose the greatest threat to 
the success of the Kyoto Protocol. Pre-
sumably they will be able to achieve 
their Kyoto targets only by purchasing 
carbon credits or by taking advantage of 
either the Joint Implementation (JI) or 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). A 
number of countries have apparently al-
ready set aside considerable resources 
for these Kyoto Mechanisms (EEA, 2005: 
24-5).  
The emergence of growth ceilings in 
CEE, would have a decisively negative 
impact on their future economic devel-
opment. While it seems unlikely (though 
not impossible) that the CEEC’s would 
surpass their Kyoto targets by 2012, the 
experience of the former cohesion coun-
tries raises important questions both 
about the potential emergence of growth 
ceilings and the continued viability of the 
                                                 
51 Cyprus and Malta have no Kyoto targets. 
Kyoto Protocol and the potential for con-
tinued GHG emission reductions. Spain, 
for example, reportedly has great poten-
tial for renewable energy investments,52 
but to-date this has had little impact on 
progress toward its Kyoto target. Unlike 
Spain, Portugal and Ireland, the CEEC’s 
have remarkable JI potential as a result 
of their high GHG emissions per unit of 
GDP. Pressure to take advantage of this 
JI potential would presumably have a 
positive impact on the potential elimina-
tion or reduction of future growth ceil-
ings. 
While pressure for JI investments 
should mount as the 2012 Kyoto dead-
line nears – in particular for those 
countries noted above that have in-
creased their effective Kyoto targets as a 
result of increasing emissions – one of 
the principal failures of the Kyoto proc-
ess has so far been its inability to re-
verse the growth – GHG nexus. In fact, 
existing Kyoto targets frequently place 
little or no real pressure on high per 
capita GHG emitters. As illustrated in 
Table 9, correlation coefficients between 
actual or effective Kyoto targets (ac-
counting for past performance) and per 
capita GHG emissions are in particular 
remarkably low for the OMS’s (EU15).53 
In order for the EU’s Emissions Trad-
ing System (ETS) to have a serious im-
pact, considerable downward pressure 
must be exerted in particular on the 
high per capita emitters in order for 
them to take advantage of JI investment 
opportunities in the more pollution inten-
sive countries. Much of that pressure 
has been deflated however as a result of 
                                                 
52 Spain topped the list of countries with renew-
able energy potential in an Ernst and Young 
report, Renewable Energy Country Attractiveness 
Indices (Winter 2006). 
53 Correlation coefficients may give a false im-
pression of the real relationship between two 
variables. For this reason, these relationships have 
also been tested in a multivariate setting along 
with other variables. There is typically not rela-
tionship between per capita GHG levels and ef-
fective Kyoto targets. When the relationship does 
appear to be significant, its impact is typically so 
small as to be inconsequential. 
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the fact that the EU has on average al-
ready come very close to meeting its 
Kyoto target. While individual countries 
still have considerable distance to make 
up (in particular Austria, Denmark, 
Finland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal and 
Spain), the relative lack of calibration 
between per capita GHG emissions and 
GHG measured as a unit of GDP as to 
make the ETS ineffective. 
This very brief analysis of the Kyoto 
Protocol does not augur well for its fu-
ture performance. Much of the system’s 
success appears to depend on the inclu-
sion of the CEEC’s in the existing 
framework and the acceptance – in par-
ticular – of generous base year alloca-
tions for Poland and Hungary.54 Much 
as with the CAP and the WTO, national 
interests in the setting of appropriate 
Kyoto targets (or CAP targets) appear to 
come into conflict with supranational or 
international agreements. In such situa-
tions, EU institutions frequently have a 
particularly difficult time superseding na-
tional interests. As a result, the estab-
lishment of realistic and meaningful tar-
gets for the next round of the Kyoto 
Protocol is likely to pose significant prob-
lems.55 
To what extent the CEEC’s benefit 
from their inclusion in the Kyoto Proto-
col is less clear. As suggested above, 
these countries would tend to benefit 
more if pressures for JI investments were 
greater. While these countries have typi-
cally received relatively generous effective 
Kyoto targets,56 they are not as likely to 
benefit from JI investments as they might 
                                                 
54 The base year allocations for Hungary and 
Poland are based on figures for 1985-87 and 
1988 respectively. The result is a quite significant 
increase in the base year for these two countries. 
Though there are discrepancies for other coun-
tries, they are small in comparison.  
55 There are already indications that multiple 
countries (e.g. Germany, the Czech Republic and 
others), will push for higher national CO2 alloca-
tions than in the period 2005-2007. 
56 The coefficient on the NMS dummy is consis-
tently significant in the above noted multivariate 
setting and leads to a typically more liberal ef-
fective Kyoto target. 
be under a more effective system. Oddly, 
the NMS’s do not appear to be well 
recompensed for the fact that they alone 
appear to explain the EU’s success in 
meeting its targets. Moreover, in its cur-
rent form at least, the system does not 
appear to reflect the needs or priorities 
of the NMS’s as much as it appears to 
do the reverse. 
CONCLUSION 
Perhaps the greatest advantages of EU 
membership are to be found in the 
greatly increased openness of the political 
process and the transparency of the EU 
environmental regulatory framework. 
Such factors greatly facilitate the moni-
toring of environmental practice and 
thereby strengthen the role of govern-
ments, environmental organizations and 
the average individual. In this respect, 
the centralization of environmental deci-
sion-making at the EU level may be an 
advantage. On the other hand, the politi-
cal process of EU policy-making seems 
skewed toward the interests of the large 
and more advanced states. This further 
appears to influence the ability of the 
Kyoto Protocol or the broader EU regu-
latory framework in reducing EU-wide 
emission levels. The findings of this 
analysis thus strengthen intergovernmental 
accounts of European integration sug-
gesting that more powerful states are 
likely to shape policies to their advantage 
(Ellison, 2006a). 
A strong case can be made that the 
top-down imposition of EU environmental 
regulation results in a potential diversion 
of resources from environmental objec-
tives corresponding to local, regional and 
state-level priorities and preferences. 
While there will doubtless be some gains 
from the adoption of EU environmental 
legislation, there are likewise significant 
costs and even some losses. Among the 
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most important of these costs are: 1) the 
diversion of financial and administrative 
resources to projects that are of less ob-
vious importance for CEEC’s, 2) a poten-
tially negative impact on the overall 
competitiveness of CEE economies, and 3) 
an undue emphasis on EU-defined priori-
ties at the expense of potentially more 
pressing local, regional or state-level 
economic and/or environmental concerns. 
In the long run it is questionable to 
what degree success in environmental 
policy depends on EU pressure. In addi-
tion to the evidence presented above, a 
recent study from the EAP Taskforce 
noted that although the CEEC’s had a 
lead on some of their Eastern neighbors 
in environmental expenditures, many of 
these countries have caught up with 
their CEE counterparts. Overall expendi-
ture on environmental policy in these 
countries – measured as a share of GDP 
– now approximates levels in CEE.57 At 
best, this questions the role and impor-
tance of EU accession on the push to 
improve the environment. The introduc-
tion of democracy and markets, the role 
of privatization and FDI, and the decline 
of heavy industry, potentially even the 
strong-minded character of those who 
forcefully pushed the environmental 
agenda in the early years of transition 
(Ellison, 2004) contribute substantially to 
an explanation of CEE environmental 
success. 
This paper has important policy impli-
cations, in particular for the NMS’s. 
There are potentially large returns from 
successfully making the jump from pol-
icy-taker to policy-maker. Rather than 
junk the whole system, the CEEC’s should 
become strong advocates for a number 
of EU reforms. For one, greater emphasis 
could be placed on EU constitutional re-
forms that shift the voting power of the 
                                                 
57 Kazakhstan, Moldova, the Russian Federation, 
Ukraine and Uzbekistan now compare favorably 
to the CEEC’s. A few countries however failed to 
achieve CEE levels of expenditure (Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Kyrgyz Republic) 
(EAP Task Force, 5/2003). 
larger more advanced states in the di-
rection of the smaller, less advanced 
states. For another, greater emphasis 
could be placed on stronger EU-based 
funding mechanisms for environmental 
investments. Finally, more effort could be 
placed on shifting some of the emphasis 
of EU environmental policy away from 
pollution intensity-based measures and 
end-of-pipe strategies toward per capita-
based measures of the environmental 
burden. Though difficult to achieve un-
der the existing decision-making mecha-
nism, the broad majority of individuals 
should benefit from a system which dis-
tributes the burden of adjustment across 
a broader range of countries aimed at 
achieving real reductions in EU-wide 
emissions. 
Clearly more work could be done. For 
one, it is necessary to explore in more 
detail the range of environmental policies 
and practices in place prior to 1989. For 
another, a more systematic account of 
the factors driving environmental policy-
making in CEE in the early years of 
transition is warranted. In addition, more 
could be done to unearth other positive 
environmental practices abandoned in the 
pursuit of EU membership. Finally, the 
degree to which the adoption of EU en-
vironmental policy has defused citizen 
participation in defining the domestic en-
vironmental agenda is worth exploring. 
This in fact may be one of the more 
significant legacies of the drive for EU 
membership and potentially one of its 
greater losses. 
 
* * * * * 
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Table 1 
Structure of GDP 
 (1990–2002) 
 
Agriculture Industry Services   
  1990 1995 2002 1990 1995 2002 1990 1995 2002 
Bulgaria 17.0 14.1 12.4 49.2 34.6 29.7 33.8 51.3 57.9 
Czech Republic 6.2 5.0 3.8 48.8 44.2 39.6 45.0 50.8 56.7 
Estonia 16.6 8.9 5.0 49.7 29.6 28.1 33.7 61.5 67.0 
Hungary 14.5 7.1 4.3 39.1 32.3 31.2 46.4 60.6 64.5 
Latvia 21.9 10.8 4.7 46.2 33.2 24.7 31.9 56.0 70.6 
Lithuania 27.1 12.0 7.1 30.9 34.0 31.2 42.1 54.0 61.7 
Poland 8.3 6.9 3.2 50.1 38.9 30.5 41.6 54.1 66.4 
Romania 23.7 21.4 13.1 49.9 42.7 38.1 26.3 35.8 48.8 
Slovakia 7.4 5.1 4.1 59.1 34.6 28.6 33.5 60.3 67.4 
Slovenia 5.5* 4.6 3.1 45.6* 38.5 36.2 48.9* 56.9 60.7 
Austria 3.8 2.7 2.4 34.1 32.4 32.0 62.1 64.9 65.6 
Belgium 2.3 1.7 1.3 32.6 29.4 27.0 65.1 68.9 71.7 
Denmark 4.5 3.7 2.5 26.5 25.8 26.4 69.0 70.5 71.1 
Finland 6.7 4.8 3.6 33.8 33.1 31.8 59.5 62.1 64.6 
France 3.8 3.4 2.6 29.7 27.3 25.3 66.5 69.4 72.1 
Germany 1.7 1.3 1.2 38.0 33.4 29.7 60.3 65.3 69.2 
Greece 10.7 10.2 7.3 28.2 23.1 23.2 61.1 66.8 69.5 
Ireland 9.1 7.6 3.3 35.0 38.0 41.5 56.0 54.3 55.2 
Italy 3.6 3.4 2.7 33.9 31.5 28.3 62.5 65.1 69.0 
Luxembourg 1.9 1.2 0.7 32.4 25.5 20.3 65.7 73.2 79.0 
Netherlands 4.5 3.6 2.6 30.4 28.7 25.8 65.1 67.6 71.6 
Portugal 8.6 5.4 3.7 31.7 31.6 28.7 59.7 63.0 67.6 
Spain 5.7 4.6 3.4 35.5 31.0 29.7 58.8 64.4 67.0 
Sweden 3.5 2.6 1.9 32.3 31.0 28.2 64.2 66.4 70.0 
UK 1.9 1.8 1.0 35.2 32.0 27.0 62.9 66.2 72.0 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2003, 2005). 
* Data from 1991. 
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Table 2 
Emissions per Unit of GDP, 1980, 1990 and 2002 
(kg per $1000) 
 
SOx NOx CO CO2 GHG  
1980 1990 2002 1980 1990 2002 1980 1990 2002 1980 1990 2002 1992 2002
Bulgaria 173.3 133.6 68.3 35.2 24.0 13.7 84.3 59.3 45.0 6,365 5,511 3,396 9,573 4,535
Czech Republic 45.2 34.6 4.1 18.7 10.0 5.5 17.9 23.1 9.4  3,014 2,120 4,016 2,461
Estonia 57.2 42.4 14.1 14.0 11.4 6.4 79.7 73.1 28.6  6,413 2,775 10,092 3,130
Hungary 42.3 23.4 7.2 7.1 5.5 3.6 26.4 23.1 12.4 2,138 1,662 1,141 2,590 1,555
Latvia 11.9 9.2 1.3 10.3 8.0 4.7 93.4 72.1 42.6  2,127 825 4,664 1,197
Lithuania  13.9 3.3  9.9 4.0  32.5 17.3  2,434 945 4,286 1,566
Poland 37.2 27.6 9.2 11.2 11.0 4.7 67.3 63.6 20.7  3,272 1,863 4,141 2,243
Romania 25.4 29.4 22.4 12.6 12.2 7.8 78.1 71.4 57.1 4,615 3,729 2,596 6,529 3,355
Slovakia 43.4 27.7 4.7 11.0 11.0 4.7 27.3 25.2 13.6  3,047 1,977 4,645 2,368
Slovenia  12.2 3.5  3.9 2.9  5.1 4.4   807  1,006
Unw. Average 54.5 35.4 13.8 15.0 10.7 5.8 59.3 44.8 25.1 4,373 3,468 1,845 5,615 2,342
Wght. Average 45.2 31.4 10.7 13.9 10.4 5.2 55.9 46.9 21.8 2,847 3,042 1,851 4,666 2,293
East Germany 54.3 44.2 4.1 2.3 1.5 0.7 10.0 6.3 2.0      
Austria 3.0 0.5 0.2 2.1 1.4 1.1 15.0 8.3 4.2 441 405 358 489 435 
Belgium 5.5 2.0 0.7 2.9 1.8 1.2 8.5 7.0 4.4 869 642 547 765 648 
Denmark 4.2 1.4 0.2 2.9 2.2 1.2 9.6 5.9 3.6 585 419 334 538 422 
Finland 7.9 2.6 0.7 4.0 3.0 1.7 8.9 5.6 4.8 771 627 561 856 661 
France 3.8 1.2 0.4 2.4 1.7 1.0 18.6 10.1 4.4 567 364 300 507 410 
W. Germany 2.7 0.6 0.1 2.7 1.8 0.8 11.4 7.3 2.3  657 457 752 538 
Greece 4.8 5.5 4.0 3.7 3.3 2.7 15.6 14.6 11.3 623 948 871 1,134 1,117
Ireland 6.7 3.9 0.9 2.2 2.5 1.2 12.1 8.5 2.4 761 674 426 1,075 640 
Italy 4.7 1.9 0.6 2.2 2.1 1.2 9.8 7.8 4.5 507 470 427 543 504 
Luxembourg 3.4 1.3 0.2 3.2 2.0 0.8 27.3 15.2 2.4 1,491 1,046 506 1,002 535 
Netherlands 2.2 0.7 0.2 2.6 2.1 1.1 6.9 4.1 1.7 686 577 470 731 568 
Portugal 4.3 3.0 2.0 2.7 2.9 2.6 12.7 9.7 6.2 460 545 621 677 750 
Spain 9.0 5.0 2.6 3.3 2.9 2.5 10.8 8.8 4.6 619 521 552 637 678 
Sweden 3.1 0.5 0.2 2.6 1.6 1.0 7.6 6.1 3.1 450 284 222 375 282 
UK 5.5 3.3 0.7 2.9 2.4 1.1 8.8 6.5 2.2 663 514 360 662 425 
Unw. Average 4.7 2.2 0.9 2.8 2.3 1.4 12.2 8.4 4.1 678 579 479 716 586 
Wght. Average 7.8 2.9 1.1 4.8 3.3 2.0 20.9 12.0 5.9 1,216 812 712 987 868 
USA 4.6 3.0 1.4 4.4 3.2 1.9 18.8 18.5 8.7 902 683 574   
Japan 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.4  1.0 0.7 330 261 250   
Sources: GDP data is from the World Development Indicators database (World Bank, 2005), SOx, NOx 
and CO emissions data is from the Environmental Data Compendium (OECD, 1999, 2002, 2005) and 
missing data is from EMEP expert emissions estimates (webdab.emep.int). CO2 and GHG emissions data 
is from Eurostat’s online data website.  
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Table 3 
Per Capita Emissions, 1980, 1990 and 2002 
(kg per person) 
 
SOx NOx CO CO2 GHG  
19
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0
 
20
0
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19
9
2 
20
0
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Bulgaria 232 229 119 47 41 24 113 102 78 8,510 9,445 5,924 13,929 7,911 
Czech republic 219 182 23 91 52 31 87 121 54  15,826 12,056 18,542 13,995
Estonia 195 161 65 48 43 29 272 276 131  24,263 12,702 27,690 14,327
Hungary 152 97 35 25 23 18 95 96 61 7,703 6,923 5,623 9,214 7,665
Latvia 38 36 5 33 31 18 300 282 161  8,313 3,126 10,816 4,536
Lithuania 91 60 12 45 43 15 159 141 64  10,537 3,516 13,780 5,823
Poland 116 84 41 35 34 21 209 195 92 12,882 10,008 8,311 12,088 10,010
Romania 48 56 42 24 24 15 147 137 106 8,666 7,173 4,838 9,971 6,254
Slovakia 157 103 19 40 41 19 99 93 55  11,275 8,050 13,696 9,645
Slovenia 124 98 36 27 32 30 36 41 45  7,313 8,199 9,381 10,222
Unw. Average 137 111 40 41 36 22 152 148 85 9,440 11,108 7,235 13,911 9,039
Wght. Average 126 101 42 39 34 20 156 151 86 7,926 9,807 7,259 12,414 8,991 
E. Germany 260 276 34 44 39 17 154 127 53      
Austria 48 10 4 33 28 25 237 163 101 6,944 7,966 8,639 10,170 10,492
Belgium 84 36 15 45 34 28 130 129 99 13,318 11,895 12,278 14,649 14,548
Denmark 88 35 5 60 55 37 202 145 107 12,286 10,255 10,089 13,388 12,758
Finland 122 52 16 62 60 40 138 112 116 11,923 12,556 13,379 15,433 15,777
France 60 23 9 38 34 23 294 193 100 8,983 7,002 6,842 9,981 9,333 
W. Germany 51 14 2 42 35 17 187 145 52 14,262 12,837 10,482 15,783 12,324
Greece 42 49 44 32 29 30 135 128 125 5,398 8,333 9,619 10,350 12,340
Ireland 65 53 25 22 34 32 118 114 65 7,419 9,067 11,746 15,233 17,661
Italy 61 31 12 28 34 23 127 126 87 6,596 7,605 8,228 8,976 9,716 
Luxembourg 66 40 7 63 61 38 531 461 110 29,052 31,655 23,009 33,562 24,341
Netherlands 35 13 4 41 39 25 109 76 41 10,855 10,782 10,969 14,194 13,273
Portugal 26 24 21 16 23 27 77 78 66 2,788 4,415 6,531 5,790 7,898
Spain 78 56 38 29 33 35 94 98 67 5,370 5,789 7,967 7,329 9,785
Sweden 59 12 7 49 38 27 145 141 86 8,594 6,549 6,146 8,460 7,812 
UK 86 65 17 46 48 27 136 129 55 10,311 10,164 9,087 12,924 10,734
Unw. Average 65 34 15 40 39 29 177 149 85 10,273 10,458 10,334 13,081 12,586
Wght. Average 64 34 14 38 37 25 164 136 74 9,567 9,166 8,939 11,629 10,898
USA 102 84 48 98 92 65 418 522 303 20,037 19,307 19,848   
Japan 11 8 7 14 17 16   33 27 7,801 8,667 9,336   
Sources: SOx, NOx and CO emissions data is from the Environmental Data Compendium (OECD, 1999, 
2002, 2005) and missing data is from EMEP expert emissions estimates (webdab.emep.int). CO2, GHG emis-
sions and population data is from Eurostat’s online data website. Missing population data (US and Japan) 
has been taken from World Development Indicators database (World Bank, 2005). 
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Table 4 
Change in Per Capita Emissions, 1990/1980, 2000/1990 and 2002/1980 
(%) 
 
 SOx  NOx CO CO2 GHG  
1990/
1980
2000/
1990 
2002/
1980 
1990/
1980
2000/
1990
2002/
1980
1990/
1980
2000/
1990
2002/
1980 
1990/
1980 
2000/
1990 
2002/
1980
2002/
1992 
Bulgaria -1.2 -47.7 -48.6 -12.4 -45.1 -49.3 -9.8 -15.2 -30.4 11.0 -39.6 -30.4 -43.2 
Czech Republic -17.0 -85.8 -89.4 -42.2 -26.3 -65.7 40.0 -47.9 -38.3  -21.4 -23.8 -24.5 
Estonia -17.7 -55.2 -66.9 -9.3 -21.2 -38.1 1.7 -46.6 -51.9  -49.4 -47.6 -48.3 
Hungary -36.2 -51.1 -76.8 -10.0 -20.9 -30.7 1.0 -35.6 -35.9 -10.1 -16.6 -27.0 -16.8 
Latvia -6.4 -80.8 -86.8 -5.4 -49.3 -46.6 -5.9 -45.8 -46.2  -64.7 -62.4 -58.1 
Lithuania -34.2 -79.6 -86.6 -4.2 -68.4 -67.0 -11.6 -43.0 -59.5  -62.7 -66.6 -57.7 
Poland -27.1 -53.7 -64.7 -3.0 -35.6 -39.3 -6.9 -54.0 -55.9 -22.3 -18.6 -35.5 -17.2 
Romania 18.5 -28.1 -12.4 -0.5 -39.6 -38.2 -6.4 -24.6 -27.4 -17.2 -41.3 -44.2 -37.3 
Slovakia -34.8 -77.6 -87.9 2.9 -51.5 -52.2 -5.8 -40.4 -44.2  -33.3 -28.6 -29.6 
Slovenia -20.6 -50.8 -71.2 17.1 -7.5 11.0 13.0 -15.7 24.4  4.5 12.1 9.0 
Unw. Average -19.4 -60.6 -71.1 -12.1 -37.3 -47.0 -2.1 -41.0 -44.1 17.7 -36.5 -23.4 -35.0 
Wght. Average -19.6 -57.1 -66.6 -13.2 -36.6 -47.1 -2.8 -43.0 -45.0 23.7 -28.1 -8.4 -27.6 
E. Germany 6.2 -87.4 -87.0 -11.4 -38.4 -49.5 -17.1 -53.1 -65.5     
Austria -78.1 -57.7 -90.7 -14.9 -14.3 -22.2 -31.0 -36.3 -57.5 14.7 2.1 24.4 3.2 
Belgium -56.7 -55.7 -82.4 -25.2 -4.3 -38.6 -1.0 -16.8 -24.2 -10.7 3.1 -7.8 -0.7 
Denmark -60.9 -84.5 -94.7 -8.2 -29.2 -37.7 -28.3 -22.2 -46.9 -16.5 -3.3 -17.9 -4.7 
Finland -57.3 -72.8 -87.0 -2.5 -24.3 -35.2 -18.8 -9.4 -16.4 5.3 -4.1 12.2 2.2 
France -60.8 -54.5 -84.9 -11.0 -27.3 -39.5 -34.2 -41.7 -65.9 -22.1 -1.1 -23.8 -6.5 
W. Germany -72.9 -88.2 -97.0 -16.8 -45.9 -59.1 -22.2 -58.8 -72.1 -10.0 -18.4 -26.5 -21.9 
Greece 16.7 -9.1 5.9 -10.3 2.7 -5.5 -5.3 9.5 -8.0 54.4 14.2 78.2 19.2 
Ireland -19.1 -34.3 -62.3 56.5 -1.6 49.3 -3.3 -35.3 -44.9 22.2 28.9 58.3 15.9 
Italy -49.5 -57.2 -79.6 20.4 -29.4 -17.8 -0.8 -27.2 -31.4 15.3 6.7 24.7 8.2 
Luxembourg -40.1 -82.0 -89.5 -4.2 -35.2 -39.4 -13.1 -75.5 -79.2 9.0 -35.0 -20.8 -27.5 
Netherlands -63.0 -62.5 -87.3 -6.0 -31.4 -39.1 -30.2 -41.8 -62.6 -0.7 -0.2 1.0 -6.5 
Portugal -7.5 -5.5 -19.8 43.6 9.8 65.8 2.2 -11.0 -14.4 58.4 41.8 134.3 36.4 
Spain -28.3 -32.1 -51.8 14.0 9.6 23.3 4.3 -26.2 -28.7 7.8 32.6 48.3 33.5 
Sweden -78.9 -50.2 -89.0 -21.9 -25.6 -44.1 -2.6 -32.9 -40.6 -23.8 -9.7 -28.5 -7.7 
UK -24.9 -69.2 -80.3 5.2 -40.3 -41.7 -5.3 -49.0 -59.8 -1.4 -10.5 -11.9 -16.9 
Unw. Average -47.2 -52.5 -76.8 -3.5 -22.0 -27.9 -15.7 -39.0 -51.9 1.8 -4.8 0.6 -3.8 
Wght. Average -46.4 -55.9 -78.1 -2.8 -28.2 -33.8 -17.5 -39.7 -55.0 -4.2 -3.5 -6.6 -6.3 
USA -17.6 -37.6 -52.8 -6.3 -21.6 -33.1 24.9 -37.0 -27.5 -3.6 2.8 -0.9  
Japan -24.3 -16.6 -37.2 20.8 -2.1 15.2  -12.5 -21.9 11.1 7.7 19.7  
Source: own calculations on the basis of the data from Table 3 
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Table 5 
Requested and Granted Transitional Periods 
 
Bulgaria Cyprus Czech Republic 
Jul-01 Open Dec-99 Dec-02 Dec-99 Dec-02  
Sector/Directive 
Chapter Opened/Closed 
Requested Granted Requested Granted Requested Granted 
Emissions of VOC from stor-
age of petrol 2010  2004    
Sulphur content of certain 
liquid fuels 2010  2004 
1 year 
derogation   A
IR
 
Q
U
A
LI
T
Y
 
Limitation of Emissions of 
VOC 2012      
Incineration of hazardous 
waste       
PCB/PCT   2010    
Waste       
Hazardous waste       
Packaging and packaging 
waste 2012  2005 2005 2005 2005 
Shipment of waste       
Disposal of oil waste       
End-of life vehicles       
Incineration of waste       
Landfill of oil shale       
Landfill of waste 2015      
Treatment of urban waste 
water 2015  
to be 
specified 2012 2010 2010 
Protection of waters against 
pollution caused by nitrates 
from agricultural resources 
    2005  
Discharges of dangerous sub-
stances into aquatic environ-
ment 
2011    
to be 
specified 
by 1999 
 
Quality of bathing water       
Quality of water intended for 
human consumption     2006  
Quality of surface water in-
tended for the abstraction of 
drinking water 
      
Ground water directive       
W
A
ST
E 
M
A
N
A
G
EM
EN
T
 
Quality of fresh waters       
Conservation of natural habi-
tats and of wild fauna and 
flora 
    2005  
Conservation of wild birds     2005  
Integrated pollution prevention 
and control 2012  2004  2012  
Air pollution from large com-
bustion plants    
special 
provisions  2007 
Substances that deplete the 
ozone layer       
Storage of asbestos waste       
O
T
H
ER
 
Health protect. of individuals 
against ionising radiation in 
relation to medic. exposure 
      
 Total # Derogations: 8 n.a. 6 4 8 3 
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Table 5 (Cont.) 
Requested and Granted Transitional Periods 
 
Estonia Hungary Latvia 
Dec-99 Dec-02 Dec-99 Dec-02 Mar-01 Dec-02  
Sector/Directive 
Chapter Opened/Closed 
Requested Granted Requested Granted Requested Granted 
Emissions of VOC from stor-
age of petrol 2007 2006   2009 2008 
Sulphur content of certain 
liquid fuels     2004  A
IR
 
Q
U
A
LI
T
Y
 
Limitation of Emissions of 
VOC     
to be 
specified  
Incineration of hazardous 
waste   2005 2005 2004  
PCB/PCT     2004  
Waste       
Hazardous waste     2004  
Packaging and packaging 
waste   2005 2005 2015 2007 
Shipment of waste       
Disposal of oil waste     2004  
End-of life vehicles     to be specified  
Incineration of waste       
Landfill of oil shale  2009     
W
A
ST
E 
M
A
N
A
G
EM
EN
T
 
Landfill of waste     2015 2004 
Treatment of urban waste 
water 2010 2010 2015 2015 2015 2015 
Protection of waters against 
pollution caused by nitrates 
from agricultural resources 
2008    2010  
Discharges of dangerous sub-
stances into aquatic environ-
ment 
2006  2009  2010  
Quality of bathing water     2008  
Quality of water intended for 
human consumption 2013 2013   2015 2015 
Quality of surface water in-
tended for the abstraction of 
drinking water 
      
Ground water directive 2006  2007  2010  
W
A
T
ER
 Q
U
A
LI
T
Y
 
Quality of fresh waters     2005  
Conservation of natural habi-
tats and of wild fauna and 
flora 
    2010  
Conservation of wild birds 2010    2010  
Integrated pollution prevention 
and control   2007  2015 2010 
Air pollution from large com-
bustion plants  2015 2004 2004 2008  
Substances that deplete the 
ozone layer       
Storage of asbestos waste     2004 2004 
O
T
H
ER
 
Health protect. of individuals 
against ionising radiation in 
relation to medic. exposure 
    2005 2005 
 Total # Derogations: 7 5 7 4 23 8 
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Table 5 (Cont.) 
Requested and Granted Transitional Periods 
 
Lithuania Malta Poland 
Nov-00 Dec-02 Jun--01 Dec-02 Dec-99 Dec-02  
Sector/Directive 
Chapter Opened/Closed 
Requested Granted Requested Granted Requested Granted 
Emissions of VOC from stor-
age of petrol 2010 2007 2005 2004 2009 2005 
Sulphur content of certain 
liquid fuels   2006  2009 2006 A
IR
 
Q
U
A
LI
T
Y
 
Limitation of Emissions of 
VOC       
Incineration of hazardous 
waste       
PCB/PCT       
Waste     2012  
Hazardous waste     2012  
Packaging and packaging 
waste 2010 2006 
2006 + 
special 
provision
2007 2007 2007 
Shipment of waste     2012 2007 
Disposal of oil waste     2005  
End-of life vehicles       
Incineration of waste       
Landfill of oil shale       
W
A
ST
E 
M
A
N
A
G
EM
EN
T
 
Landfill of waste 2015     2012 
Treatment of urban waste 
water 2015 2009 2009 2007 2015 2015 
Protection of waters against 
pollution caused by nitrates 
from agricultural resources 
2011    2010  
Discharges of dangerous sub-
stances into aquatic environ-
ment 
  2009 2007 to be specified 2007 
Quality of bathing water       
Quality of water intended for 
human consumption 2015  2006 2005   
Quality of surface water in-
tended for the abstraction of 
drinking water 
    2010  
Ground water directive       
W
A
T
ER
 Q
U
A
LI
T
Y
 
Quality of fresh waters       
Conservation of natural habi-
tats and of wild fauna and 
flora 
2010      
Conservation of wild birds 2010  special provision 2008   
Integrated pollution prevention 
and control   2004  2010 2010 
Air pollution from large com-
bustion plants  2015 2006 2005  2017 
Substances that deplete the 
ozone layer   
special 
provision  2006  
Storage of asbestos waste       
O
T
H
ER
 
Health protect. of individuals 
against ionising radiation in 
relation to medic. exposure 
    2006 2006 
 Total # Derogations: 8 4 10 7 14 10 
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Table 5 (Cont.) 
Requested and Granted Transitional Periods 
 
Romania Slovakia Slovenia 
Mar-02 Open Mar-01 Dec-02 Dec-99 Dec-02  
Sector/Directive 
Chapter Opened/Closed 
Requested Granted Requested Granted Requested Granted 
Emissions of VOC from stor-
age of petrol 2010  2010 2007   
Sulphur content of certain 
liquid fuels     2004  A
IR
 
Q
U
A
LI
T
Y
 
Limitation of Emissions of 
VOC 2015  2010    
Incineration of hazardous 
waste   2006 2006   
PCB/PCT       
Waste       
Hazardous waste       
Packaging and packaging 
waste 2010   2007 2007 2007 
Shipment of waste       
Disposal of oil waste       
End-of life vehicles       
Incineration of waste 2010      
Landfill of oil shale       
W
A
ST
E 
M
A
N
A
G
EM
EN
T
 
Landfill of waste 2017      
Treatment of urban waste 
water 2022  2015 2015 2015 2015 
Protection of waters against 
pollution caused by nitrates 
from agricultural resources 
2014  2008    
Discharges of dangerous sub-
stances into aquatic environ-
ment 
2015  to be specified 2006   
Quality of bathing water       
Quality of water intended for 
human consumption 2022  2008    
Quality of surface water in-
tended for the abstraction of 
drinking water 
      
Ground water directive       
W
A
T
ER
 Q
U
A
LI
T
Y
 
Quality of fresh waters       
Conservation of natural habi-
tats and of wild fauna and 
flora 
      
Conservation of wild birds       
Integrated pollution prevention 
and control 2015  2011 2011 2011 2011 
Air pollution from large com-
bustion plants 2012  2010 2007   
Substances that deplete the 
ozone layer       
Storage of asbestos waste       
O
T
H
ER
 
Health protect. of individuals 
against ionising radiation in 
relation to medic. exposure 
      
 Total # Derogations: 11 n.a. 9 7 4 3 
Source: European Commission (2002) and negotiating position papers of individual candidate countries. 
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Table 6 
Total Estimated Compliance Costs for EU Environmental Regulation 
(Euros, billions) 
 
 Cost as Share of 2001 GDP 
Number Years to 
Comply 
Total Cost 1997 Esti-
mate 
DANCEE 2001 Cost 
Estimate 
Bulgaria 56.5% 34 15 8.61 
CzR 9.7-13.8% 9-12 13.4 6.6 - 9.4 
Estonia 70.4% 39 1.5 4.41 
Hungary 7.1-17.3% 7-15 13.7 4.12 – 10 
Latvia 17.2-27.5% 15-21 1.71 1.48 - 2.36 
Lithuania 12.1% 11 2.38 1.6 
Poland 10.7-20.7% 10-17 35.2 22.1 - 42.8 
Romania 49.0% 31 22 22 
Slovakia 11.2% 10 5.4 4.81 
Slovenia 20.6% 17 1.84 2.43 
Total   121.5 78.15 - 108.42 
 
Table 6 (Cont.) 
 
Compliance Cost-
ing (1997) 
Danish EPA 
(By Function) 
Compliance Costing (By Func-
tion) 
 
MIN MAX 
Urban 
Waste 
Water 
Waste 
Landfill/ 
Recycling
Large 
Combus-
tion Plants
IPPC Water Air Waste max. 
Bulgaria 11.7 15 2.056 2.45 1.627 3.261 4.9 5.1 5.1 
CzR 10.4 13.4 1.164 1.12 1.858 3.725 3.3 6.4 3.8 
Estonia 1.5 1.5 0.168 0.683 0.312 0.489 1.5 n.a. n.a. 
Hungary 11.5 13.7 1.678 0.43 0.878 1.761 6.6 2.7 4.4 
Latvia 1.71 1.71 0.579 0.332 0.043 0.09 1.71 n.a. n.a. 
Lithuania 2.38 2.38 0.435 0.354 0.074 0.044 2.38 n.a. n.a. 
Poland 34.1 3.52 6.414 3.609 3.456 6.927 18.1 13.9 3.3 
Romania 20.2 22 1.385 2.494 0.402 0.806 10.1 9.1 2.7 
Slovakia 4.1 5.4 0.499 0.87 0.796 1.596 1.9 1.9 1.6 
Slovenia 1.84 1.84 0.914 0.798 0.18 0.05 n.a. 0.69 1.15 
Total 108.4 121.5 15.295 13.14 9.626 18.749 50.5 48.2 22.7 
Sources: Environmental Policy Europe (1997) and DANCEE (2001). Compliance costs as a share of GDP 
and estimates of the number of years to comply are based on GDP data from Eurostat’s online dataset 
and DANCEE compliance costs estimates. Calculations of the number of years required for compliance are 
based on the following assumptions: annual environmental expenditures of 1% of GDP and an average 
annual growth rate of 3%. 
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Table 7 
Predicted Environmental Expenditure, 2007–2013 
(Select Countries) 
 
 
Structural and  
Cohesion Funds 
(Mill Euros) 
 (2007-2013,  
Final 2006) 
Environmental Invest-
ment Share (Bank-
watch) 
Projected Environ-
mental Expenditure  
(Euros, billions) 
DANCEE 2001 Cost 
Predictions  
(Euros, billions) 
CzR 23,697 20.0% 4.739 6.6-9.4 
Estonia 3,058 12.8% 0.392 4.41 
Hungary 22,451 16.4% 3.671 4.12-10 
Latvia 4,090 14.8% 0.605 1.48-2.36 
Lithuania 6,097 15.2% 0.927 1.6 
Poland* 59,698 38.4% 22.924 22.1-42.8 
Slovakia 10,264 18.0% 1.848 4.81 
Bulgaria 6,047 23.8% 1.437 8.61 
Sources: SCF data is from COM(2006) 281 final. Bankwatch data is from www.bankwatch.org. Cost 
estimates are from DANCEE (2001). 
* includes infrastructure and environmental expenditure 
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Table 8 
Kyoto Targets and Per Capita and GDP Measures  
of Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
 
 
Country 
Change in 
GHG 
2004/1990 
Kyoto Target 
(2012) 
Effective 
Kyoto Target
(2004) 
Per Capita 
GHG  
(2004) 
GHG per Unit 
of GDP 
(2002) 
Change in 
GHG 
2004/2001 
CzR -25.1% -8.0% 17.1% 14,405.3 2,461.14 -1.3% 
Estonia -50.0% -8.0% 42.0% 15,764.9 3,130.37 12.1% 
Hungary -32.0% -6.0% 26.0% 8,214.1 1,555.03 -1.1% 
Latvia -58.5% -8.0% 50.5% 4,613.7 1,196.95 -2.7% 
Lithuania -60.1% -8.0% 52.1% 5,891.1 1,565.71 1.5% 
Poland -31.6% -6.0% 25.6% 10,117.7 2,243.48 0.9% 
Slovakia -30.3% -8.0% 22.3% 9,479.4 2,368.28 -1.9% 
Slovenia -0.8% -8.0% -7.2% 10,068.1 1,006.12 0.5% 
CEEC8: -32.5%           
Average:  -7.5% 28.6% 9,819.3 1,940.9 1.0% 
Austria 15.7% -13.0% -28.7% 11,216.1 435.16 7.4% 
Belgium 0.7% -7.5% -8.2% 14,226.1 648.28 0.6% 
Denmark -1.8% -21.0% -19.2% 12,616.7 421.94 -2.7% 
Finland 14.5% 0.0% -14.5% 15,594.8 661.31 8.5% 
France -0.8% 0.0% 0.8% 9,345.5 409.76 0.1% 
Germany -17.5% -21.0% -3.5% 12,301.9 537.74 -1.9% 
Greece 23.9% 25.0% 1.1% 12,463.0 1,117.45 3.5% 
Ireland 22.7% 13.0% -9.7% 17,007.2 640.23 -3.5% 
Italy 12.3% -6.5% -18.8% 10,062.5 504.49 3.8% 
Luxembourg 0.3% -28.0% -28.3% 28,122.2 534.92 27.0% 
Netherlands 1.6% -6.0% -7.6% 13,396.5 568.44 0.8% 
Portugal 41.0% 27.0% -14.0% 8,067.1 750.48 0.6% 
Spain 47.9% 15.0% -32.9% 10,105.0 678.05 11.1% 
Sweden -3.6% 4.0% 7.6% 7,787.7 281.95 1.3% 
UK -14.1% -12.5% 1.6% 11,043.6 424.88 -1.7% 
EU15: -0.9%      
EU23: -7.4%      
Average (EU15):   -2.1% -11.6% 12,890.4 574.3 3.7% 
Average (EU23):   -4.0% 2.4% 11,822.2 1,049.7 2.7% 
Sources: Kyoto target, 2004/1990, 2004 and 2001 performance data from EEA (2006: p. 11, Table ES.1), 
GHG/GDP data from Table 3, and per capita estimates based on population date from the Eurostat online 
database. 
 
 
 
Table 9 
 Correlation Coefficients between Kyoto Targets  
and Per Capita or GDP Measures of GHG Emissions 
 
Effective Kyoto Targets (2001) Kyoto Target (ignores current perf.)  
EU15 CEEC8 EU23 EU15 CEEC8 EU23 
Per Capita GHG's -0.10 -0.39 -0.41 -0.41 -0.08 -0.2476
GHG per unit of GDP 0.09 0.25 0.74 0.63 -0.08 -0.0478
Source: own calculations based on data from Table 8 above and EEA (2006: p. 11, Table ES.1). 
 
 
